We study collusion in a second price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show there always exists a robust equilibrium in which the collusion success probability is one. In the equilibrium, the interim expected payoff of the collusion initiator Pareto dominates the counterpart in any robust equilibria of the single-option model (Esö and Schummer (2004)) and any other separating equilibria in our model.
Introduction
Under standard assumptions auctions are a simple yet effective economic institution that allows the owner of a scarce resource to extract economic rents from buyers. Collusion among bidders, on the other hand, can ruin the rents and hence should be one of the top issues that are always kept in the minds of the auction designers with a revenue-maximizing objective. In the literature, collusion in auctions are typically modelled as a static game in which bidders already agree to form a cartel and the mission of the cartel is to select a representative bidder (to win the object at a low price in the auction) and decide the side-payments (e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987) , Mailath and Zemsky (1991) , Marshall and Marx (2007) , and McAfee and McMillan (1992) ). Although collusion can be guaranteed through a revelation game, the working of such a cartel typically requires the aid of an incentiveless third party. Furthermore, the static model misses a realistic and important scenario when a particular bidder has strong bargaining power and thus is interested in monetizing it through some bargaining process with other bidders.
In a pioneering work, Esö and Schummer (2004) (hereafter, ES) consider a dynamic model of bidder collusion in a second price auction before which a bidder has the opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of bribe in exchange for the opponent's absence from the auction (or bidding zero). Since their work, alternative models in the same vein have been proposed. For example, Rachmilevitch (2013) considers the same bargaining protocol in first price auctions and Rachmilevitch (2015) assumes equal bargaining power between the bidders who can make an offer sequentially. Troyan (2017) extends ES's model to interdependent values and affiliated signals.
The papers cited above share a common feature, i.e., the collusion proposal specifies a positive transfer from the initiator to the opponent. However, it is natural that if offering a bribe to the opponent is feasible then requesting a bribe from the opponent should also be available in the initiator's toolbox.
The collusion initiator may consider a combination of both a bribe and a request for the following two reasons. First, with one more option available for the opponent to choose to accept, it seems to improve the probability of successful collusion (if the initiator cares about it), as compared to the single-option scheme.
Second, and most importantly, a double-option scheme seems to be more lucrative for the initiator, provided it can be successfully implemented.
With the additional option, a multi-dimensional signaling game emerges and the problem of adverse selection may be more severe, so that the existence and robustness of equilibria are at stake. To examine the implementability, we consider a second price auction with two bidders, as in ES. Specifically, we assume that a bidder has an opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, consisting of both a bribe and a request, to the opponent before a second price auction starts.
The opponent can accept at most one option in the proposal, in which case both bidders follow the proposal and bid cooperatively in the auction. If the opponent rejects the proposal, then both bidders compete non-cooperatively in the auction.
The solution concept we use is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter, equilibrium) . If an equilibrium survives the D1 criterion (Cho and Sobel (1990) ), the same standard refinement used in ES, it is said to be robust. 1 To illustrate our main points, we focus on separating equilibria. Although there may exist a multiplicity of separating equilibria, we show that there always exists a robust separating equilibrium in which the initiator's request is equal to his valuation. In the equilibrium, the opponent always accepts the collusion proposal (accepting one of the two options), i.e., for each type of the initiator, the probability of a successful collusion is one. The significance of this result is threefold. First, a separating equilibrium does not always exist in ES's model. Secondly, in ES, the initiator typically can not be guaranteed a successful collusion because the best response of the opponent is to accept the bribe if her type is low and reject it otherwise. Hence, in our model, such a double-option scheme generally improves the probability of successful collusion upon the single-option one. Thirdly, perhaps more importantly, the result shows that second price auctions in this dynamic environment are as vulnerable as in the static model, even though now the bidders do not agree on collusion beforehand and both acts strategically. 2 It is interesting to compare the expected payoff of the initiator in our model with the counterpart in ES. On one hand, it seems that the additional option itself alone represents an additional channel through which the initiator can extract more surplus from the opponent. On the other hand, the additional option tends to intensify the adverse selection problem. In particular, an interesting feature of the separating equilibrium is that the bribe may exceed the initiator's valuation, which 1 Milgrom and Roberts (1986) apply the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987) ), which is weaker than the D1 criterion, for their multidimensional signaling model of price and advertising expenditure decisions by a firm trying to convey information about its product quality to consumers.
2 In Rachmilevitch (2015) , under some conditions, there exists an efficient equilibrium in which a successful collusion is also guaranteed. However, in that model the two bidders engage in two rounds of alternating offers of bribes and thus neither of them has full bargaining power.
suggests it can be very costly for the initiator to signal his strength. We show that in the identified separating equilibrium the double-option scheme generally improves profitability for each type of the initiator upon ES on the basis of the D1 criterion. Thus in the sense of Pareto dominance, the initiator has strong incentive to implement the double-option scheme.
As mentioned above, in our model there may exist a multiplicity of separating equilibria. Hence, it is natural to ask if there exist any separating equilibria in which (at least) for some types of the initiator the expected payoff can be even higher. It turns out that the expected payoff of the initiator in the identified equilibrium Pareto dominates the counterpart in any other separating equilibrium in our model.
For convenience of exposition, our main results are derived with the absence of a reserve price in the auction. As explained in section 5.1, a positive reserve price essentially does not change the results.
Although in this paper we focus on second price auctions, we also notice that even if the auction format is changed to a first price auction, a separating equilibrium always exists as well. This is in sharp contrast with the results in Rachmilevitch (2013) which considers a bribing model as ES but with a first price auction.
We explain the observation in section 5.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief review of related literature is given for the rest of this section. In section 2 we describe the model. In section 3 we characterize the separating equilibrium and show its robustness. In section 4 we compare the payoff of the initiator in our model to the counterpart in any robust equilibria in ES and other separating equilibria in our model. In section 5 we give a brief discussion of the role of a reserve price and a switch to a first price auction. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to the growing literature of collusion in auctions. As mentioned in the introduction, the traditional approach is to consider a static game before which some bidders have already agreed on participation of collusion. On the other hand, ES-like dynamic models typically assume the single-option collusion proposal, i.e., an offer of a bribe, from the bidder with the move to the opponent, in exchange for the latter's cooperation. For example, apart from the papers mentioned in the introduction, Chen and Tauman (2006) address the potential collusion problem of the opponent cheating by using shill bidders in second price auctions. Kivetz and Tauman (2010) consider a complete information model of a first price auction. Balzer (2019) considers a more general set of mechanisms for first price and second price auctions. The main difference is that we consider a simple and natural double-option proposal in a second price auction and focus on its implementability and profitability for the initiator while his main objective is to examine the difference between a first price and a second price auction in terms of the possibility of efficient collusion.
More broadly, our paper is related to the strand of mechanism-design literature that studies the informed-principal problem, due to the seminal works of Myerson (1983) , Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Maskin and Tirole (1992) . In particular, Maskin and Tirole (1990) consider a private value setting in which the principal proposes a contract that itself is a game to be played when it is accepted by the agent and the whole game ends if it is rejected. They show that the principal is generally better off as compared to the scenario when his type is of complete information.
Our paper is also related to the literature of multidimensional signaling games pioneered by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Wilson (1985) . In particular, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) study the problem of a firm that can use both price and advertising expenditure to signal its product quality to consumers. In their model, the firm has only two types and the advertising expenditure is dissipative. In contrast, in our model the initiator has a continuum of types and neither of the signals is dissipative.
The model
Two risk-neutral bidders are about to attend a second price auction in which there is a single indivisible object and no reserve price. 3 Before the auction starts, bidder 1 (he) has an opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to bidder 2 (she).
The proposal consists of a nonnegative bribe and a nonnegative request, denoted by (b, r) with b, r ≥ 0. If bidder 2 accepts the bribe, then bidder 1 pays b to her and she bids zero in the auction so that bidder 1 wins the object at a price of zero. If bidder 2 accepts the request, then she pays r to bidder 1 who then bids zero in the auction and she wins the object at a price of zero. If bidder 2 rejects the proposal, then both bidders bid non-cooperatively in the auction.
We assume bidders' valuation (or type) distributions are independent, but allow for asymmetry. For i = 1, 2, bidder i's valuation v i is independently distributed
We focus on pure strategy separating equilibria. So both bidders use pure strategies whenever they are supposed to take the move. We assume that if bidder 2 rejects the proposal then both bidders bid truthfully in the second-price auction since it is a weakly dominant strategy.
We let b(v 1 ) and r(v 1 ) be the bribing and requesting functions in an equilibrium. One immediate observation of our model is that if v 1 ≥v 2 , then there always exists a separating equilibrium in which b(v 1 ) = 0 and r(v 1 ) = v 1 . In the equilibrium, all types of bidder 2 accepts the zero bribe and bidder 1 realizes his valuation. 4 Hence, below we focus on the non-trivial case of v 1 <v 2 .
A separating equilibrium
Suppose there exists a separating equilibrium in which bidder 1's request is not greater than his own valuation. We assume that bidder 2 is willing to accept a proposal if she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. 5 In the equilibrium, upon receiving a separating proposal (b, r) from type v 1 , for bidder 2, accepting b gives a payoff of b, accepting r gives a payoff of v 2 − r and rejecting the proposal gives a payoff of v 2 − v 1 . Thus, if r ≤ v 1 , it is optimal for bid-
For convenience of exposition, let v 1 be the smallest value such that, if it exists,
The following proposition shows that for any distribution F 1 and F 2 , there always exists a separating equilibrium in which bidder 1 requests his own valuation.
Proposition 1. There exists a separating equilibrium in which
with an initial condition b(v 1 ) = 0, which always admits a unique solution.
For
Proof. For any type v 1 < v 1 , the on-path incentive compatibility (IC) condition for
In the equilibrium with r(v 1 ) = v 1 , the bribing function b(v 1 ) satisfies
which in turn can be rewritten as (2).
With the initial condition b(v 1 ) = 0, which implies b (v 1 ) > 0, the differential equation in (2) always has a unique solution. It also follows that
and is an admissible bribing function.
Observe that (2) implies b(v 1 ) + v 1 is strictly increasing for all v 1 and thus the equilibrium is separating.
Technically, for any type v 1 > v 1 , r(v 1 ) can be any value such that b(v 1 ) + r(v 1 ) ≥v 2 and r(v 1 ) takes different values for different v 1 . Alternatively, in an equilibrium, for any type v 1 > v 1 , r(v 1 ) can be equal to v 1 so that there is a pooling segment on the top. However, the equilibria are essentially equivalent.
for any type v 1 > v 1 , b(v 1 ) = b(v 1 ), since for these types the equilibrium proposals must be such that b(v 1 ) are always accepted by all types of bidder 2 and the equilibrium payoff of such types is v 1 − b(v 1 ).
We now show that there is no profitable on-path deviation for any type v 1 , i.e.,
given that all other types of bidder 1 are following the equilibrium proposals, it is
for any given t, the envelope theorem implies that
There are two types of off-path deviations in the equilibrium. First, there are many unsent off-path proposals by bidder 1. Second, because in the equilibrium,
given an on-path proposal, bidder 2 on the path is supposed to accept the proposal with probability one, rejection becomes an off-path deviation as well. However, for the latter type of off-path deviations, it is straightforward to see that for any belief of bidder 1 it is not profitable for any type of bidder 2 to reject the received equilibrium proposal, since it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder 1 to submit a bid of his valuation in the auction. So the only non-trivial type of off-path deviations is the former, which is two dimensional and thus of a large set.
Below, we show that there exists a system of off-path beliefs of bidder 2 such that given the resulting best-response of bidder 2, it is not profitable for bidder 1 to deviate to any off-path proposals. In particular, the off-path beliefs of bidder 2 are reasonable in the sense of the D1 criterion.
Cho and Sobel's D1 criterion says that if, upon observing an off-path action, any best responses of the receiver (based on some beliefs about the sender's type) that imply a profitable deviation for a sender type imply also a profitable deviation for another sender type and the converse is not true, then, upon observing that off-path action the receiver's posterior beliefs should place zero probability on the former type. Roughly speaking in an alternative way, if a type of the sender is dominated by another type in terms of the expected payoff of the sender for possible best responses of the receiver, then the former type should be excluded from the set of reasonable beliefs of the receiver. Hence, if for an off-path action there exists some type of the sender that is not dominated by any other types, then a reasonable belief of the receiver is that it is the sender's type. If for each off-path action, there exists such a reasonable belief that the best response of the receiver based on the belief implies that it is not profitable for any type of the sender to deviate to the off-path action, then the equilibrium survives the D1 criterion.
We first describe the set of best responses of bidder 2 upon receiving an off-path proposal (b, r).
Lemma 1. Upon receiving an off-path proposal (b, r), the best response of bidder 2 can be described as a pair of critical values
Proof. Observe that bidder 2 never accepts r if her type v 2 ≤ b+r and never accepts b otherwise. That is, for any type v 2 ≤ b + r, her best response is either to accept b or reject the proposal (thus compete with bidder 1 in the auction). Similarly, for any type v 2 > b + r, her best response is either to accept r or reject the proposal.
As shown in ES, when bidder 2's decision making problem is to determine whether to accept or reject a bribe b (and thus compete non-cooperatively with bidder 1 in the auction), the decision rule requires that for any type v 2 and v b 2 , if type v b 2 accepts b, then any type v 2 < v b 2 accepts b. We show below that when bidder 2's decision making problem is to determine whether to accept or reject a request r (and thus compete non-cooperatively with bidder 1 in the auction), the decision rule requires that for any type v 2 and v 2 , if type v 2 accepts r, then any type v 2 > v 2 accepts r.
First we suppose b + r <v 2 . Let the set of types of bidder 1 sending proposal (b, r) be Q b,r . Suppose v 2 , v 2 ≥ b + r and v 2 > v 2 . For bidder 2 with type v 2 , the difference between the expected payoffs from accepting r and rejecting the
where 1 X is the indicator function for event X. Thus,
Therefore, there exists a v r 2 ≥ b + r such that any type v 2 ≥ v r 2 accepts r and any type v 2 ∈ (b + r, v r 2 ) rejects the proposal. If also follows from above that if b + r ≥v 2 , then the statement in the lemma is automatically true. This completes the proof.
For convenience, we record the following fact which follows directly from the envelope theorem and (2).
For an off-path proposal (b, r), given a best response (v b 2 , v r 2 ) of bidder 2 as described in Lemma 1, the expected payoff of type v 1 , denoted by π(v 1 , b, r, v b 2 , v r 2 ), is given by
The derivative of π
Recall that π (v 1 ) = F 2 (b(v 1 ) + v 1 ). Because b(v 1 ) > 0 for any type v 1 > v 1 , (7) implies that given any v b 2 and v r 2 , π v 1 (v 1 , b, r, v b 2 , v r 2 ) < π (v 1 ) for any type v 1 ≥ v b 2 . Thus we have the following fact.
Fact 2. For an off-path proposal (b, r) and a best response
The next two facts identify some off-path proposals that would never be made by any type of bidder 1.
Fact 3. Consider an off-path proposal (b, r). If r ≤ v 1 , then it is not profitable for any type v 1 to deviate to (b, r) for any belief of bidder 2.
Proof of Fact 3: Recall that when bidder 2 receives a proposal (b, r), accepting r gives a payoff v 2 − r while rejecting the proposal gives a payoff v 2 − v 1 . Thus, if r ≤ v 1 , then the proposal is never rejected.
Intuitively, since bidder 1's value for bidder 2 is at least v 1 , bidder 1 does not have an incentive to request an amount lower than v 1 . Fact 3 implies we can restrict attention to proposals with r > v 1 .
The following fact further excludes proposals (b, r) with r > v 1 and b ≥v 2 −v 1 .
Fact 4. Consider an off-path proposal (b, r). If r > v 1 and b ≥v 2 − v 1 , then it is not profitable for any type v 1 to deviate to (b, r) for any belief of bidder 2.
Proof of Fact 4: If r > v 1 and b ≥v 2 − v 1 , then the bribe is accepted by all types of bidder 2, since b ≥ v 2 − v 1 implies that for any type v 2 , accepting b is more profitable than competing with bidder 1 in the auction and b ≥v 2 − v 1 > v 2 − r implies accepting b is more profitable than accepting r, i.e., the best response of bidder 2 is described by v b 2 =v 2 = v r 2 . So the expected payoff of bidder 1 with type v 1 is π
Fact 3 and Fact 4 together imply we can restrict attention to proposals with r > v 1 and b <v 2 − v 1 .
Proof of Fact 5: From (6),
. By the monotonicity of π(v 1 , b, r, b+v 1 ,v 2 ) and π(v 1 ), we have
since we assume v 1 <v 2 . By the similar arguments in the case of b > 0, we also
. This completes the proof.
We are now ready to show that the equilibrium identified above survives the D1 criterion.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium identified above survives the D1 criterion.
Proof. By Fact 3 and Fact 4, we can focus on off-path proposals (b, r) with r > v 1 and b <v 2 − v 1 . So b + v 1 < b + r and b + v 1 <v 2 . For convenience of exposition, below we consider only the case b + r ≤v 2 . The analysis of the case of b + r >v 2 is identical and omitted. 9
The lowest belief of bidder 2 is v 1 = v 1 . If bidder 2 believes v 1 = v 1 , accepting b gives b, rejecting the proposal gives v 2 − v 1 . So any type
Hence, below we can focus on the beliefs such
. 10 Suppose b = 0 and v 1 = 0. When v b 2 = v 1 = 0, and v r 2 =v 2 , i.e., the proposal is rejected by all types of bidder 2 and both bidders compete in the auction, only type v 1 is indifferent between the equilibrium payoff and the payoff from the deviation while all other types of bidder 1 are strictly worse off. To see this, the expected payoff from the deviation is the one from a standard second price auction, which has a slope F 2 (v 1 ), which in turn is strictly smaller than π (v 1 ) = F 2 (b(v 1 ) + v 1 ).
Hence, type v 1 = 0 can not be excluded by the D1 criterion and a reasonable belief of bidder 2 is that bidder 1's type is v 1 = v 1 = 0. Since b = 0, the best response of bidder 2 with this belief is then to reject the proposal and compete with bidder 1 in the auction. Then the above confirms it is not profitable for any type of bidder 1 to deviate to the off-path (b = 0, r). Hence, below we only need to examine the event b > 0 or v 1 > 0.
For a given pair of (b, r), let
Clearly for any given v b 2 ∈ [b+v 1 , b+r] and v r 2 ∈ [b+r,v 2 ], π(v 1 )−π(v 1 , b, r, v b 2 , v r 2 ) is well defined on [v 1 ,v 1 ] and continuous in v 1 . By the extreme value theorem, it admits a maximum for any v b 2 , v r 2 in the relevant intervals. The solution to maximization problem in (8) is continuous and thus M(v b 2 , v r 2 ) is continuous. Suppose for a given proposal (b, r), there exists no
for any type v 1 , i.e., it is not profitable for any type of bidder 1 to deviate to (b, r) for any belief of bidder 2 and we are done. (7) and Fact 1), we can conclude that for any
Suppose for a given proposal
By the fact that
is strictly convex (again from (7) and Fact 1), V 1 is a singleton.
Hence, type v * is not excluded by the D1 criterion. So a reasonable belief of bidder 2 is that bidder 1's type is v 1 = v * and we adopt this belief for the analysis below.
Suppose the tangency point is at v 1 and thus a reasonable belief of bidder 2 is v 1 = v 1 . Then for bidder 2, accepting b gives b, accepting r gives v 2 − r and rejecting the proposal gives v 2 − v 1 . Since r > v 1 and b <v 2 − v 1 , it is optimal for bidder 2 to accept b if v 2 ≤ b + v 1 and reject the proposal otherwise. Then Fact 5 implies it is not profitable for any type of bidder 1 to deviate to the proposal.
It follows then that below we can focus on interior tangency points, i.e, v * ∈ (v 1 , v b * 2 ). It in turn follows that
If v * ≥ r, then the best response of bidder 2 is to accept b if v 2 ≤ b + r and accept r otherwise.
Then the expected payoff of any type v 1 from the best response is then exactly π(v 1 , b, r, v b * 2 , v r * 2 ), which, by tangency, is no greater than π(v 1 ) and we are done. The sub-case v * < r is analyzed below together with the case of v b *
Then we can always conclude v * < r. To see this, observe that type v * is indifferent between π(v * , b, r, v b * 2 , v r * 2 ) and π(v * ), i.e.,
So below we can focus on the belief v 1 = v * < r, with which the best response of bidder 2 is to accept b if v 2 ≤ b + v * and reject the proposal otherwise. And the expected payoff of bidder 1 from the proposal is then π(v 1 , b, r, b + v * ,v 2 ).
By Fact 2, we can for now restrict our attention to type v 1 ≤ b + v * . For any
The tangency condition says, for any type v 1 ,
Furthermore, recall that π(v 1 ) is strictly convex and observe that π(v * , b, r, b + v * ,v 2 ) has a constant slope for
Aggregating all above cases, the proof of the equilibrium surviving the D1 criterion is completed.
The following example sheds some light on the equilibrium.
With the initial condition b(0) = 0, the equilibrium bribing function b(v 1 ) is plotted in Figure 1 . First, the bribing function can be non-monotone for high types. In our game, both the bribe and the request are costly signals. Intuitively, for low types of bidder 1, both the bribes and the requests are low, so that with high probability the requests are accepted. Hence, for a low type of bidder 1 to separate himself from even lower types, it is necessary to raise the bribe high enough so that it is costly enough for even lower types to have no incentive to mimic him. On the other hand, for high types, the probability of the requests being accepted is low and thus the signals from the requests themselves are very costly and it is unnecessary to offer a too high bribe. In the uniform case, it is even feasible to lower the bribe for high enough types.
Second, unlike in the single-option model of ES, here for some low types of bidder 1, the bribe may exceed his valuation.
The fact that the equilibrium bribe may exceed bidder 1's valuation suggests that it can be very costly for some types of bidder 1 to signal his strength. In contrast, in ES's single-option model, the separating bribes do not exceed bidder 1's valuation. 11 It is interesting to investigate whether it is more profitable for bidder 1 to implement the double-option scheme.
The expected payoff of the initiator
In this section we first compare the expected payoff of bidder 1 in the identified robust equilibrium in our model to the counterpart in ES.
In ES, bidder 1 commits to offering a variable take-it-or-leave-it bribe to bidder 2. For separating bribes, let the bribing function be B es (v 1 ) in their model. Then the incentive compatibility condition for type v 1 with a separating bribe is
.
Under some regularity conditions, ES identify the set of equilibria that survive the D1 criterion. In such an equilibrium, for somev 1 , the bribing function, denoted by B(·), is
whereB ≥v 2 − E[v 1 |v 1 ≥v]. The expected payoff function of bidder 1, denoted by Π(·), in such an equilibrium is
Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a robust equilibrium in ES. Then π(v 1 ) ≥ Π(v 1 ) for any v 1 .
Proof. In our model the expected payoff of bidder 1 is π(
. In a robust equilibrium with a bribing func-
which is also true for type v 1 >v 1 in fact. Thus
So far, we have focused on the separating equilibrium in which bidder 1's request is his valuation. Clearly any pair of (b(v 1 ), r(v 1 )) satisfying the incentive compatibility condition in (4), with r(v 1 ) ≤ v 1 , can sustain a separating equilibrium if (b(v 1 ), r(v 1 )) is separating. Moreover, there may also exist some equilibria in which for some type v 1 , r(v 1 ) > v 1 so that the request is never accepted. A natural question is whether the expected payoff of bidder 1 can be improved in some of those separating equilibria against the equilibrium identified above. We show below that in term of bidder 1's expected payoff, any separating equilibrium in which r(v 1 ) = v 1 is dominated by the one identified above with r(v 1 ) = v 1 .
Proposition 4. Suppose in our model there exists a different separating equilibrium with a pair of bribing and requesting functions (β (v 1 ), γ(v 1 )). Let the expected payoff of bidder 1 in the different equilibrium be π(v 1 ; β , γ). Then π(v 1 ) ≥ π(v 1 ; β , γ).
Proof. Suppose first that γ(v 1 ) ≤ v 1 for any type v 1 . Clearly, π(v 1 ; β , γ) = F 2 (β (v 1 )+ γ(v 1 ))(v 1 −(β (v 1 )+γ(v 1 )))+γ(v 1 ). The envelope theorem implies that π (v 1 ; β , γ) = F 2 (β (v 1 ) + γ(v 1 )). Thus,
Suppose now that γ(v 1 ) > v 1 for some type v 1 . For any such a type v 1 , the request is never accepted and the bribing function β (v 1 ) must satisfy the incentive compatibility condition in ES's model. Consequently, the expected payoff of any such type v 1 must be no greater than the one in the equilibrium with r(v 1 ) = v 1 .
This completes the proof.
Discussions

Reserve price
We note that the previous results remain essentially unchanged even if there is a reserve price in the auction. Specifically, given a positive reserve price, there exists a robust separating equilibrium in which conditional on the object being sold, i.e., at least one of the bidders' valuations exceeds the reserve price, the the collusion success probability is one. The intuition is the following. Let the reserve price be R. Observe that any type of bidder 1 below R has no value for bidder 2. In the separating equilibrium similar to the above, these types are correctly identified as below R. So for any type v 1 ≤ R, the equilibrium bribe b(v 1 ) = 0, which is never accepted by any v 2 > R, and any request r(v 1 ) > 0 (= 0) will be rejected (accepted) by any type of bidder 2. On the other hand, for any type v 1 > R, the equilibrium request is r(v 1 ) = v 1 − R, i.e., the valuable part for bidder 2 since if bidder 2 accept the request, she still needs to pay R to the auctioneer.
More formally, when a proposal (b, r) from type v 1 is separating and r ≤ v 1 − R, then bidder 2 accepts b if v 2 ≤ b + r + R and accepts r if v 2 > b + r + R. So the expected payoff of bidder 1 with type v 1 is π(v 1 ) = F 2 (b + r + R)(v 1 − b − R) + (1 − F(b + r + R))r, which can be rewritten as π(v 1 ) = F 2 (b + r + R)(v 1 − (b + r + R)) + r.
The IC condition for the separating equilibrium with r(v 1 ) ≤ v 1 − R becomes
In the equilibrium with r(v 1 ) = v 1 − R, it is the same as (2). The only difference is that the initial condition is changed into b(v 1 ) = 0 and r(v 1 ) = 0 for all v 1 ≤ R.
Hence, the equilibrium proposal of any type of bidder 1 is always accepted by bidder 2 (although a zero request has no value for her if her valuation is not higher than the reserve price).
First price auction
We observe that with the double-option scheme the initiator may also be able to secure a successful collusion even if the auction format is changed to a first-price auction. Rachmilevitch (2013) considers the same single-option scheme as in Esö and Schummer (2004) but with first price auctions. The important result from his model is that existence of a separating equilibrium is generally impossible and there may even be no pooling equilibrium. In his model, an important feature of the (pure strategy) equilibrium of the continuation games is that when a proposal reveals the initiator's type perfectly and is rejected, the initiator bids his valuation, v 1 , and the rejectors submit the "minimally winning" bid if they find winning worthwhile, i.e., a value of v + 1 , which wins with certainty against any v 1 ≤ v 1 (but pays v 1 ) and loses against any v 1 > v 1 . The driving force for his results of nonexistence of equilibrium is that a high-type initiator has the incentive to cheat the opponent by mimicking a low type v 1 because on the path the bribe b(v 1 ) of the low type v 1 can be rejected and once it is rejected the high type can bid a value marginally higher than v + 1 and win the auction at a low price. We note that a double-option model for a first price auction shares the same feature of truthful bidding of the initiator when the auction format is changed to a first price auction. It then implies that in the double-option model with a first price auction, for any given separating proposal, the best response of the opponent is the same as the one in the case of a second price auction. Hence, the expected payoff of the initiator is the same as well. Since on the path the proposal is always accepted, the continuation games are never played and thus become off-path events. Hence, the driving force for the nonexistence of a separating equilibrium in Rachmilevitch (2013) disappear in the double-option model. Hence, the same separating weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium as in the case of a second price auction exists. On the other hand, whether the equilibrium survives any reasonable off-path refinement is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Conclusion
We have examined a collusion model for second price auctions in which a bidder has the opportunity to propose a combination of an offer and a request of bribes to the other bidder. The bidders are involved in a multidimensional signaling game.
Even when asymmetry is allowed, we show the collusion initiator with full bargaining power can always secure a successful collusion in such a dynamic environment, as in the previous literature with a static environment. This result confirms the vulnerability of second price auctions in dynamic environment and is in sharp contrast to the previous dynamic models with single-option considered in Esö and Schummer (2004) . Furthermore, we show that the initiator's payoff from such a double-option scheme is generally improved against the single-option scheme.
Thus an initiator with full bargaining power has strong incentive to implement such a scheme.
